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AUTHOR

George Younger

L

am currenUy a senior at the University of Kentucky
double majoring in philosophy and history, and I plan
on attending law school in the fall of 2006. This essay was
written as a term paper for Dan Breazeale's course on
Nietzsche. During the fall semester of 2004, we read everything that Nietzsche wrote that was published in his lifetime. By the end of the course (and after writing twenty-one
reaction papers) this final essay basically wrote itself. This
was easily the best course I have ever taken. Dr. Breazeale
deserves much of the credit, but Nietzsche deserves quite a
bit as well (if it had been a course on Plato or Descartes
then it would not have affected me as it did) . Though I had
read some Nietzsche before this course, it was not until this
course that I really discovered Nietzsche. The subject of
free will has interested me for years. As a freshman I came
to the conclusion that it did not exist, though it was not
until reading Nietzsche that I found a philosopher who
would back me up .

Daniel Breazeale
Professor of Philosophy
Distinguished Professor Arts and Sciences 2005-2006
The relationship between "Freedom and Necessity" is one of the most vexing
and controversial issues in all of Nietzsche scholarship. George Younger's treatment of U1e issues involved is balanced and mature, and his analysis is based
upon a thorough - indeed, virtually complete - familiarity with the relevant
texts. His interpretation of the famous "doctrine of eternal recurrence," which
many view as a serious obstacle to any efforts to impute to Nietzsche a robust
defense of human freedom, is ingenious and plausible. Indeed, one suspects
that Nietzsche hin1self would have welcomed Mr. Younger's "practical" (rather
than metaphysical or theoretical) interpretation of this doctrine. In the end, Mr.
Younger defends a "deterministic" reading of ietzsche's position, while insisting (in good Nietzschean fashion) upon boU1 the utility of the belief in free will
and the even greater dangers inherent in that same belief, understood as an
effort to impugn reality itself. Here again fue empha is i upon the practical
objections to the belief in metaphysical freedom and the practical advantages of
the doctrine of amor fati. The same virtue that distin!!Ui h Mr. Younger's discussion of freedom and nece ity a! o d1aracteriz hi judiciou di cussion of
the relationship between "idea!i m" and ··realism" in ietzscbe's Thu Spoke
Zarathustra, a particularly intriguino feature f v hid1 i hi bold distinction
between Zarathustra's own an1bivalent bl nd of reali m and ideali m and
Nietzsche's own uncompromising realism.

Nietzsche could truthfully be identified as one
of the greatest philosophers of human freedom.
On the other hand, it would be just as accurate
to describe Nietzsche as one of history's greatest opponents to human freedom because he
asserts unequivocally that free will does not exist. Universal necessity must be accepted as the
very basis of Nietzsche's metaphysics. Many
writings of Nietzsche concern this metaphysical
unfreedom, yet his Thus Spoke Zarathustra provides perhaps the greatest "handbook" to human freedom that the world has ever known.
The discrepancy that arises between human freedom and universal necessity does so because
Nietzsche never explicitly attempts to reconcile
these ideas. I attempt to reconcile this discrepancy by distinguishing between the metaphysical level (in which free will cannot exist) and
the practical level (in which the illusion free will
could never be entirely eliminated). In terms
of Nietzsche himself, we must distinguish between Nietzsche the metaphysician and
Nietzsche the philosopher. Though there was
never an explicit reconciliation of freedom and
necessity in Nietzsche's
works, there exists, however, a powerful, implicit
reconciliation in the figure of Zarathustra. I believe Zarathustra alone
illustrates how one actually lives the coexistence
of freedom and necessity.

Friedrich Nietzsche
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'7n every word he contradicts,
this most Yes-saying of all spirits;
in him all opposites are blended into a new unity."1• 2

Nietzsche is referring to Zarathustra, the hero of his
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but this passage aptly describes Nietzsche as well. When scholars think of
Nietzsche, often "unity" is furthest from their minds.
He appears to contradict himself from one sentence
to the next, allowing many readers to discount conflicting ideas in his writings. It is unfortunate that so
many of his ideas are discredited simply because they
do not conform readily to one another. It is the task
of the student of Nietzsche to find the proper perspective from which they can be reconciled with each other
- the perspective from which "all opposites are
blended into a new unity."
One such task involves the reconciliation of
Nietzsche's ideas on freedom. Nietzsche never wavers
from his assertion that there is absolutely no "'freedom of the will' in the superlative metaphysical sense,
which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of
the half-educated. "3 Free will is acknowledged as just
one among many illusions of mankind. Despite the
fact that "the single human being is a piece of fatum
from the front and from the rear, "4 Nietzsche proceeds
to describe how one "becomes free." His books from
Human, All Too Human to The Gay Science illustrate
the development of the "free spirit," "a spirit that has
become free, that has again taken possession of itself. "5
Zarathustra teaches men freedom, or, more precisely, the freedom of a creator. Why would Nietzsche
teach freedom if he knew that ultimately this very
freedom was an illusion? It is because at heart
Nietzsche is a philosopher. He has employed the qualities of the scientist, the scholar, the metaphysician,
and the cosmologist to show that there is no free will
on the metaphysical level. But on tl1e practical level
(the level of illusion, the level in which mankind must
exist and suffer, the level that even Nietzsche cannot
escape) mankind can have "freedom" to tile full extent that an individual can become free. Nietzsche the
metaphysician ends his work content with the knowledge that freedom does not exist. However, Nietzsche
the philosopher is concerned primarily with the practical level; his concern is what is done with the knowledge of unfreedom. On this level, Nietzsche (along
with other spirits that have become free) must utilize
a practical freedom to tackle "the problem of value,
the determination of the order of rank among values. "6
We must begin the exploration of freedom on tile
metaphysical level. The first time that Nietzsche proclainls that there is no free will is in section 106, "By
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the waterfall," of Human, All Too Human, and it deserves to be quoted
in its entirety:
At the sight of a waterfall we think we see in the countless
curvings, twistings and breakings of the waves capriciousness
and freedom of will; but everything here is necessary, every
motion mathematically calculable. So it is too in the case of
human actions; if one were all knowing, one would be able to
calculate every individual action, likewise every advance in
knowledge, every error, every piece of wickedness. The actor
himself, to be sure, is fixed in the illusion of free will; if for one
moment the wheel of the world were to stand still, and tl1ere
were an all-knowing, calculating intelligence there to make use
of this pause, it could narrate the future of every creature to the
remotest ages and describe every track along which tllis wheel
had yet to role. The actor's deception regarding himself, tl1e
assumption of free-will, is itself part of the mechanism it would
have to compute. 7
At tllis preliminary stage, free will does not exist because everytlling
could be calculated and predicted, but all of tl1e elements of universal
necessity can be found in tllis passage. Here, the illusion of the "actor"
is first proposed and, as well, the notion that action itself is an illusion.
One also gets the sense that no specific "cause and effect" can be isolated from this whole- tl1at every part of the waterfall (or of our world)
is completely connected to every other part. Nietzsche uses tl1e imagery
of the rolling wheel to illustrate the "unfolding" nature of reality. "By
the waterfall" asserts that everything is calculable and necessary but
does not attempt to prove it; for proof of these premises one must delve
deeper into Nietzsche's cosmology.
Upon an initial orientation with tile idea of complete unfreedom (of
complete necessity), an individual may assume that he or she has no free
will simply because of "cause and effect. " If one does not believe in a
"soul" that is the product of some divine endowment (which really must
be a starting point for a student of Nietzsche) , til en what is left in the
world besides cause and effect? An action that I perform (an effect)
seems like no more than the product of some cause[s]. But this
interpretation is not the interpretation of Nietzsche; it is a misinterpretation
of reality. To someone who has finally "seen through the boorish simplicity
of tllis celebrated concept of 'free will"' Nietzsche says, "I beg of him to
carry his 'enlightenment' a step further, and also put out of his head the
contrary of tllis monstrous conception of 'free will' : I mean 'unfree will,'
which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect. "8 Cause and effect are
not the origin of our unfreedom:
Cause and effect: such a duality probably never exists; in truth
we are confronted by a continuum out of which we isolate a
couple of pieces, just as we perceive motion only as isolated
points and then infer it without ever actually seeing it. The
suddenness with which many effects stand out misleads us;
actually there is an infinite number of processes that elude us.9
A "continuum" is one way to describe the nature of reality, and it is
Nietzsche's interpretation of reality. The implications of this "continuum"
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are staggering. If the universe is a continuum, then
the concept of identity is an illusion. Other illusions,
misinterpretations, and errors "include the following:
that there are equal things; that there are things,
substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to
be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is
also good in itself. "10
The interpretation of reality that humanity has
come to accept as fact is based on natural laws. These
laws are an attempt to implant order into our world
and reduce something strange to something familiar.
However, Nietzsche counsels us to "beware of saying
that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities. " 11 He states, "The total character of the world,
however, is in all eternity chaos - in the sense not of
a lack of necessity but of a lack of order[ ... ]."
The lack of order referred to here is a lack of purpose, not a lack of calculability. There is no purpose
to the world in the sense that a "god" created us for a
purpose or that we have some special reason for existing. Some might see a lack of order as proof that
humanity has free will because there would be no
laws to bind anyone. Nietzsche counters this attitude
by asserting, "[The world] has a 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, not because laws obtain in it, but
because they are absolutely lacking, and every power
draws its ultimate consequences at every moment. " 12
There are an infinite number of possible interpretations of natural phenomena, and Nietzsche acknowledges that his is just another interpretation:
Supposing that this also is only interpretation - and you will be eager enough to make
this objection? - well, so much the better. 13
One might assume from this statement that all
interpretations are equal; however, this is not true.
The interpretation of the physicist is a misinterpretation because it is based on error. Nowhere did
Nietzsche claim that his interpretation was true while
all others were false, yet the reader has to infer as
much. He did not interpret the nature of reality differently simply for his own pleasure; Nietzsche believed that his interpretation was a better
approximation of "the way things are."
So how is it that Nietzsche was "more right" 14
and everyone else (who experience natural laws such
as gravity daily) so consistently wrong? How could
the tremendous error of identity develop in the mind
of humanity? The answer lies in our evolution and
survival:

G EORGE

YouNGER )

gards both nourishment and hostile animals
- those, in other words, who subsumed
things too slowly and cautiously - were favored with a lesser probability of survival than
those who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that they must
be equal. The dominant tendency, however,
to treat as equal what is merely similar- an
illogical tendency, for nothing is really equal
- is what first created any basis for logic.
[... ] The beings that did not see so precisely
[the changes in things] had an advantage over
those that saw everything "in flux. " 15
Those humans who saw the world as it is, in a
state of flux, would have died out a long time ago. A
creature who could recognize "a snake" for "a snake"
would have had the advantage over a creature who
saw a snake as a completely new thing (or could not
distinguish the snake as "a thing" in the first place).
Similarly, those who saw a "cause and effect" in natural
phenomena had the advantage over those who could
not. It is not wrong to see things in terms of cause
and effect; they have been fundamental to our survival, and even now we could not function without
t11ese concepts. Nietzsche believed that cause and
effect should only be used "as conventional fictions
for the purpose of designation and communication not for explanations," 16 meaning that they should only
be used practically and not metaphysically.
In survival lay the primary origin of illusion, including the illusion of free will. Free will originates in
the concept of the "ego," which is a result of the development of consciousness. Nietzsche understands
consciousness as accidental to humanity's existence,

not essential:
For we can think, feel, will, and remember,
and we could also "act" in every sense of
that word, and yet none of all this would have
to "enter our consciousness " (as one says
metaphorically). The whole of life would be
possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a
mirror. Even now, for that matter, by far the
greatest portion of our life actually takes place
without this mirror effect. [.. .] For what purpose, then, any consciousness at all when it
is in the main superfluous? 17
Nietzsche's answer is that "consciousness has
developed only under the pressure of the need for communication: " 18

Those, for example, who did not know how
to find often enough what is "equal" as re-
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For just as popular mind separates the lightning from its flash
and takes the latter fo r an action, for the operation of a subject
called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from
expression of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum
behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or
not to do so . But there is no substratum; there is no "being"
behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction
added to the deed - the deed is everything. Popular mind in
fact doubles the deed; when it sees the lightning, it is the deed
of a deed: it posits the same event first as cause and then a
second time as effect. 23
Because of humanity's use of language, it cannot free itself
from this error. In language, "the fundamental errors of reason
[...] are petrified."24

As the most endangered animal, he needed
help and protection, he needed his peers, he
had to learn to express his distress and to
make himself understood; and for all of this
he needed "consciousness " first of all, he
needed to "know" himself and what distressed him, he needed to "know " how he
felt, he needed to "know " what he thought. 19
Therefore, "the development of language and the
development of consciousness[ ... ] go hand in hand. "20
Nietzsche repeatedly stresses that the development of
these capacities was not the result of evolution toward perfection. On the contrary, the fact that consciousness and language developed demonstrates that
humans were sick because they could no longer rely
on their instincts:
In this new world they no longer possessed
their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning ,
coordinating cause and effect, these unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their
"consciousness," their weakest and most
fallible organ! 21
Nietzsche describes consciousness as "the most
superficial and worst part" of thinking, and states that
"whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same
token shallow, " because consciousness involves "corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and
generalization. "22 Language, too, relies on these false
generalizations. For an individual to speak he must
lie. Language operates by naming and classifying
objects as well as finding relationships between them.
It relies on the fundamental assertions of identity and
equality. However, these concepts are merely illusions
and errors. They only exist in our minds because
these illusions were (and still are) necessary for our
survival.
With the development of consciousness and language came the development of the "ego." This "ego"
is responsible for the feeling that an "I" actually performs an action, and this action is done of one's own
free "will. " In reality, however, there is no "will" lying behind every action. Language helps propagate
the feeling of freedom because it separates a subject
from its action. The "ego" is another illusion that
developed for means of survival. The result of its
development is the belief that there is an autonomous
actor behind every action. However, the actor cannot
be separated from the action:
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Thi s brings us to an essential question of Nietzschean philosophy: is
it possible to live in an illusion if one knows it is an illusion? The specific
instance that concerns this paper is whether one can live in the illusion
of free will if one knows that, in fact, it does not exist. I believe that the
answer to this question can be surmised from an examination of the
origins of humanity's great illusions. Some popular illusions, like that of
God or of a metaphysical good and evil, came only very recently in the
development of man. These illusions could be eliminated, and not only
would humanity continue to function properly in their absence, but we
would be better off with them gone. However, man never chose to develop consciousness or to recognize identity; it simply happened. The
human mind changed in such a way as to be incapable of seeing r~ality
in flux or reality as a continuum. There are some illusions that cannot
be eliminated from the mind of an individual. Free will is one such
illusion because it is now bound with the concept of "ego."
How is it possible that Nietzsche can profess knowledge of this "continuum" and our "unfreedom" if his mind does not possess the capacity
to see these things? I would argue that while Nietzsche knows these
truths, he cannot live these truths. He has had moments of "enlightenment" in the sense that he recognizes the essential accuracy of an idea,
but as a human he is forced to interpret this truth; he is forced to see it
through perspectives. This passage helps to explain this process of enlightenment or discovery:

Only we have created the world that concerns man! - But precisely this knowledge we lack, and when we occasionally catch
it for a fleeting moment we always forget it again irnmediately.25
When one comes to an insight about the nature of the world it is not
forever fixed in consciousness. Even if it could be forever fixed in our
consciousness, this insight would now fall victim to the "corruption,
falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization" 26 that is
consciousness. We know that almost all of our thoughts and actions
never reach consciousness, that they take place unconsciously. If the
knowledge of illusions (such as free will) cannot properly be understood
consciously, perhaps the home for this knowledge is in the unconscious?
For this to be the case, humanity would have to have an instinctual
understanding of the true nature of reality. This is not the case. We have
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evolved in such a way that a human being now sees
identity, equality, and opposites instinctually. Therefore, the knowledge of universal necessity has no
natural home in the human being, neither in the conscious mind nor the unconscious mind.
In response to the initial question (whether one
could intentionally live in illusion if it were recognized as illusion), we now have to say that this question is irrelevant; although we can know that these
fundamental errors of reason are errors, we cannot
live this knowledge. What about specific cases that
seem to prove that humanity is capable of living this
knowledge? For instance, if we abolish our current
criminal justice system (because it is based on the
idea that everyone possesses free will and is ultimately
responsible for his or her actions) is that not a means
of living the knowledge? To a degree it could be described as living in a world that recognizes universal
necessity. To a degree humans could change much
of their current activity and base it on this new understanding.
Nietzsche describes how one would live with this
knowledge:
He may no longer praise, no longer censure,
for it is absurd to praise and censure nature
and necessity. As he loves a fine work of art
but does not praise it since it can do nothing
for itself, as he stands before the plants, so
must he stand before the actions of men and
before his own. He can admire their strength,
beauty, fullness, but he may not find any
merit in them Y
However, even Nietzsche must ultimately live his
life in illusion. On the level of daily life, he must act
as though he has an "ego" that performs actions,
and he must see identity in objects. He cannot escape this, because he is human. If Nietzsche could
live in a world without identity then he would not be
able to speak. (In fact, Nietzsche did not speak for
the last eleven years of his life: 1889-1900. Is this
evidence that Nietzsche moved on to a higher plane
of existence? Probably not.)
At this point it would be easy to take the next
step and ascribe to reality a dual nature: the "true"
world and the "apparent" world. The apparent world
would be that which our consciousness has created;
it would be a world of language and identity and
equality and will. The true world would seem to be
one to which humanity does not have access, because we have developed the inability to comprehend the "continuum." Nietzsche, however, is against
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dualism in all its forms. He is against those who would
disvalue the world of our senses for another world:
All the philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept mummies;
nothing real escaped their grasp alive. [... ]
Now they all believe, desperately even, in
what has being. But since they never grasp
it, they seek for reasons why it is kept from
them. "There must be mere appearance, there
must be some deception which prevents us
from perceiving that which has being: where
is the deceiver?
"We have found him," they cry ecstatically;
"it is the senses! These senses, which are so
immoral in other ways too, deceive us concerning the true world. "28
When the harmful notion of the "true world " is
abolished (though its abolition has not yet been fully
recognized), Nietzsche asked "What world remained?
The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true
world we have also abolished the apparent one. "29
The world that is left to us is the world, the one and
only world. According to Nietzsche, our senses do
not deserve contempt for providing humanity with
unreliable information about the world. The information the senses present is wholly accurate; it is our
interpretation of this information that is false. If anything is to blame it is our consciousness (or our reason) for once again causing "corruption, falsification,
reduction to superficialities, and generalization . "30
Despite Nietzsche's reluctance to divide the world
in two, for practical purposes it is simply unavoidable. To describe the nature of freedom in Nietzsche's
writings, one has to divide our knowledge into the
metaphysical (the world as it is, the world of flux),
and practical (the world as humans understand it, the
world of identity and equality). But this division is
not a division of the world itself; it is a division of our
knowledge of the world. This division into "metaphysical" and "practical" is arbitrary and in no way
absolute. Like the use of cause and effect, the concepts "metaphysical" and "practical" should only be
used "as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation and communication - not for explanations. "31 The remainder of this discussion on freedom
will employ the duality of metaphysics and practicality only as "conventional fictions. "
For Nietzsche, the task of the philosopher is to
find "the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order and rank among values. " 32 It is
critically important to note that the task of the philosopher is not to describe the nature of reality; that is
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the task of the metaphysician/scientist/ cosmologist.
Thus far, no philosophy (in Nietzsche's sense of the
word) has actually been discussed in this essay, because all we have done is described the nature of
reality. Philosophy for Nietzsche is a reaction to the
knowledge of the metaphysical, a reaction that is
confined to the realm of the practical.
Nietzsche highlights this division:
You have to believe in fate - science can
compel you to. What then grows out of this
belief in your case - cowardice, resignation
or frankness and magnanimity- bears witness to the soil upon which that seedcorn
has been scattered but not, however, to the
seedcorn itself - for out of this anything
and everything can grow. 33

morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to
customs, of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are
the traditional ways of behaving and evaluating. [.. .] What is
tradition? A higher authority which one obeys, not because it
commands what is useful to us, but because it commands. 37

Here we see that fate (as opposed to the concept
of free will) is a matter of science. It is the responsibility of science to show that there is no free will.
Philosophy, however, is concerned with "what then
grows out of this belief. " Nietzsche does not believe
that the knowledge of universal necessity is inherently positive or negative; it is what one makes of it.
Nietzsche describes two problematic responses
to the knowledge of universal necessity which come
from two "opposite standpoints:"
some will not give up their 'responsibility,'
their belief in themselves, the personal rights
to their merits at any price (the vain races
belong to this class) . Others, on the contrary, do not wish to be answerable for anything, or blamed for anything, and owing to
an inward self-contempt, seek to lay the
blame for themselves somewhere else. 34
A major concern in the philosophy of Nietzsche
is the individual reaction to "the abysmal thoughts"
that arise from the knowledge of unfreedom. 35 An
individual is not truly free until he or she has come
to terms with unfreedom, but this final stage is buried too deep within Nietzsche's philosophy to use as
a starting point of discussion; to begin a survey of
practical freedom in Nietzsche, one must first examine the "free spirit."
On the practical level, an individual begins his
or her life unfree. This is because one is born into a
society of morality, responsibility, custom, and law.
Nietzsche states, "With the aid of the morality of mores and the social strai~acket, man was actually made
calculable."36 Man was made calculable and predictable in the practical sense because he was made
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"tame. " With man tame, an individual can predict that he or she will not
be harmed by other individuals because everyone is wearing the "straitjacket" of morality. Not only is morality confining the individual, but the
threat of punishment is also keeping individuals tame and predictable.
Nietzsche recognizes the value that morality has had in the past to
bring people to a level where they can live in society. But morality is
something that must be overcome. Morality, by definition, is handed
down from one generation to the next. The "Thou shalts" and the "Thou
shalt nots " of morality are what proved useful to a past generation. The
role of the current generation is simply to obey:

Morality represents the wisdom of an age that no longer exists. It is
knowledge that resulted from years of both successful and failed experiments. However, one of the demands of morality is that all experimentation stops . Eventually it is forgotten that morality is the result of
experimentation, and morality takes on the significance of a divine or
natural law. In reality there is no divinity (therefore no divine law) and
"nature is always value-less. "38
The act of becoming free in the individual (and freedom in Nietzsche's
writings was always viewed as the result of a conscious effort) 39 is the
shedding of morality. Nietzsche states, "The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and
not upon tradition. "40 Society calls free individuals evil because they are
disobedient to tradition. In this way, society offers "resistance" to freedom, and Nietzsche measures freedom "according to the resistance that
must be overcome, according to the exertion required to remain on top."
Accordingly, "the free man is a warrior. "41
It is the freedom of the warrior that is preached by Zarathustra; however, the ultimate freedom lies beyond the warrior in the creator.
Zarathustra envisions three stages of freedom in the individual, or "three
metamorphoses of the spirit." First, the spirit "becomes a camel; and the
camel, a lion; and the lion finally, a child. "42 In the first stage the spirit is
indiscriminately loaded like a camel with knowledge and philosophy. At
this stage of development the individual is not to judge among various
philosophies; the individual is simply a student. As a camel, the spirit
bears much on its back and speeds into the "desert" of philosophies. It is
in this landscape, the "loneliest desert, " that the second metamorphosis
takes place:
Here the spirit becomes a lion who would conquer his freedom
and be master in his own desert. Here he seeks out his last
master: he wants to fight him and his last god; for ultimate victory he wants to fight with the great dragon.43
This "last master" or "great dragon, " can be many things; this spirit's
"last god" could be God, it could be social convention and morality, or it
could just as easily be Nietzsche and his philosophy. No matter what this
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last master is, it must be conquered by the individual
in order to become free. It is not until this second
stage, the stage of the lion, that the spirit has become
free.
Why go to war at all? What matters my freedom?
These questions will plague the free spirit soon after
it has broken free of its chains. Attaining freedom is
pointless in itself, according to Nietzsche; the free spirit
will realize that something is lacking: "Free from what?
As if that mattered to Zarathustra! But your eyes
should tell me brightly: free for what?" 44 This
newfound freedom is only a beginning, and a "freed"
spirit will recognize this fact after tl1e triun1ph of the
"victory" has worn off:
A victory has been won - a victory? over
what? over whom? An enigmatic, questionpacked, questionable victory, but the first victory nonetheless: such bad and painful things
are part of the history of the great liberation.
It is at the same time a sickness that can destroy the man who has it, this first outbreak
of strength and will to self determination, to
evaluating on one's own account, this will to
free will: and how much sickness is expressed
in the wild experiments and singularities
through which the liberated prisoner now
seeks to demonstrate his mastery over
things! "45
In this state of sickness, the spirit now regards
itself as metaphysically free because it feels the exhilaration of practical freedom . The chains of custom
and morality have been cast off, and '"freedom of
will' really means nothing other than feeling no new
chains. "46 This freedom is an illusion, yet it is an
illusion that Nietzsche embraces as a step toward true
freedom.
As a camel, the spirit longs for freedom but recognizes that it has much to learn before it can reject.
As a lion, the spirit tears down without the capacity
to rebuild, without tl1e capacity to create. Before writing Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche said, "We can
destroy only as creators. "47 But by the time of writing
Zarathustra, Nietzsche saw that there was another
option: nihilism. The philosophy of Nietzsche is an
attempt to counter nihilism. The niliilist tears down
without rebuilding; more accurately, the nihilist tears
down and then attempts to erect nothingness, or a
will to nothingness. The nihilist is "free from " but not
"free for; " only the creator is "free for. " The free spirit
must be "free for" the creation of new values, but
freedom itself is not enough:
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To create new values - that even the lion
cannot do; but the creation of freedom for
oneself for the new creation - that is within
the power of the lion.48
The final metamorphosis is needed in order to
create new values:
Why must the preying lion still become a
child? The child is innocence and forgetting,
a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled
wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." For
the game of creation, my brothers, a sacred
"Yes" is needed: the spirit now wills his own
will, and he who had been lost to the world
now conquers his own world.49
The highest freedom of which Nietzsche conceives
is not really freedom at all from the point of view of
the "free spirit" or the "lion." The free spirit is free
because he is bound by no chains, no laws, and no
morality. In the final metamorphosis, where the spirit
becomes like a child, it gives up this freedom as it
becomes "the judge, the avenger, and the victim of its
own law."50 This subjection to law is the answer to
Zarathustra's question: "free for what? " Zarathustra
further questions whether the spirit is capable of such
hardships:
Can you give yourself your own evil and your
own good and hang your own will over yourself as law? Can you be your own judge and
avenger of your law? Terrible it is to be alone
with the judge and avenger of ones own law.
Thus is the star thrown into the void and into
the icy breath of solitude. 51
As the creator of one's own law (as tl1e creator of
good and evil} , the individual is no longer a "free
spirit. " An apt title for such a creator is "philosopher" because it is his or her task to determine the
rank ordering of values. By creating one's own law
the individual is determining this order of values. All
"freedom" has been leading up to this point because
"whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily
he must be an annihilator and break values. "52 However, it is not accurate to say that Nietzsche saw creators as unfree. What tl1ey possess is the freedom of
self-mastery; they have ordered their drives, or instincts, so as to create a strong and healthy self.
Nietzsche states: "He who really possesses himself,
that is to say he who has definitely conquered himself, henceforth regards it as his own privilege to punish himself, to pardon himself, to take pity on himself:
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he does not need to concede this to anyone else. "53
Zarathustra was a creator of his own law, but in
creation he did not find ultimate freedom. This is
because Zarathustra also possesses the knowledge of
universal necessity. His case proves that "anything
and everything" can grow out of the knowledge of
fate. 54 What developed in Zarathustra was his "abysmal thought" which is based on his belief in the "eternal recurrence." The eternal recurrence is the idea
that all events repeat themselves exactly (and in exactly the same order) over massive intervals of time.
This idea is based on the notion of infinity. If three
premises are true: 1. time is infinite. 2. energy is finite 3. the number of possible states of energy is
finite - then every possible state that this energy could
be in will eventually occur, and every state will occur
an infinite number of times. Therefore, everything
that is happening now has already happened an infinite number of times in the past and will happen an
infinite number of times in the future. It is not clear
to what degree Nietzsche actually believed in the eternal recurrence, but nevertheless it still troubles
Zarathustra greatly. Zarathustra knows that if he is
going to return infinitely, then the rabble (or the common man) will also return.
Even if one does not believe in the eternal recurrence, everyone who understands the doctrine of universal necessity should encounter a similar problem:
For the world to be the way it is now, everything that
has happened (the good and the bad) was necessary.
Likewise, for me to exist now, even the rabble has to
exist now. Alexander Nehamas doesn't believe that
the eternal recurrence needs to be true for the psychological consequences to be the same. He clarifies
this point as follows:

was and as it will be. If there were no rabble, there would be no
Zarathustra . If Zarathustra did not experience all of the hardships, evils,
and sicknesses in his own life, then he would not be Zarathustra.
Nietzsche himself demonstrated throughout his life a remarkable gratitude for all of his experiences, despite the fact that his life was one of
incredible physical suffering and loneliness:

Nietzsche believes that every event in the
world is inextricably connected with every
other; he believes that if anything had occurred differently, everything would have
occurred differently, that if anything happened
again, everything would happen again. He
thinks the history of the world or (in more
modest terms) the history of each person is
implicit in every moment. 55

Nietzsche is right to call idealism cowardice, but he is wrong to say
that Zarathustra is the paradigm of realism. The fact that freedom is
taught by Zarathustra despite the fact that it does not exist is not an
example of realism. The teaching of freedom is the result of Nietzsche's
cowardice in the face of reality. Is the "creation of value" taught by
Zarathustra anything more than the creation of ideals? The freedom of
the "free spirit" is an ideal that has been erected on a foundation of
illusion and error. Nietzsche would call freedom a value, not an ideal,
but that does not clear him from the charge of idealism.
For a human, there is no escaping idealism. What makes one human is the process of valuing. Valuation should be taken seriously, but
at the same time it requires "laughter" above all. This laughter is a result
of the knowledge tl1at "only we have created the world that concerns
man." 60 An individual can laugh at the fact that although much of our
understanding is based on error, we still must live in this world of error.
One can divide freedom into metaphysical and practical, but that does
not change the fact that there is no free will . Nietzsche said, "The 'unfree will' is mythology; in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak

It is this insight that allows Zarathustra to conquer his "abysmal thought." He realizes everything is
necessary for his existence, even the rabble. When
Zarathustra was able to overcome tl1is demon, "he
jumped up. No longer shepherd, no longer human
- one changed, radiant, laughing!" 56 Zarathustra
learned amor fati, or "love of fate." Not only did he
desire that his life be as it is and as it was and as it
will be, but also that everything be as it is and as it
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My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that
one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward,
not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still
less conceal it - all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of
what is necessary- but love it Y
Zarathustra alone seems capable of reconciling freedom and necessity: "in him all opposites are blended into a new unity. "58 Is Zarathustra
"living the knowledge" of universal necessity or is he still trapped in the
illusion of free will? In the character of Zarathustra there seems to be a
unity of both freedom and necessity; he seems to live the knowledge to
the highest degree that one should live it. It is possible that one could
reject this world to such degree that he or she acquires some mystical
insight into this "unfolding. " Such an individual, however, would come
under sharp criticism from Nietzsche because of this negating, ascetic
drive. Nietzsche finds fault with all those who have a "will to nothingness," be they Buddhists or Christians or anyone who strives for the
beyond. Nietzsche stresses tl1at this is the only world that exists, and
even if there were a metaphysical beyond, we would have no access to
it.
Zarathustra seems to have found a middle ground between idealism
and realism. Nietzsche would not agree with this estimation because
Nietzsche believes that he and Zarathustra are the ultimate realists:
Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker. His doctrine, and his alone, posits truthfulness as the highest virtue;
this means the opposite of the cowardice of the "idealist" who
flees from reality. 59
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wills. "61 The key to understanding this sentence is the phrase "real life. "
In "real life," or "the world that concerns man," there is freedom, but we
created it. The sentence that Nietzsche should have added next is: "Strong
and weak wills are mythology, in reality it is only a matter of necessity. "
In the end, it is Zarathustra to whom we must look for an example
of how to live life (how to live a free life) with the knowledge of universal necessity. Zarathustra's life helps illuminate the ambiguous middle
ground between idealism and realism. Most importantly he illustrates
the doctrine of amor fati , or love of fate. It is inaccurate to say that those
who believe in free will cannot be happy, but a higher happiness is
reserved for those who have put such simplistic notions out of their
head. One has to love the necessity found in the world. The highest
freedom ultimately comes from the knowledge of unfreedom.
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